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Jurisdictional Statement 
This court has jurisdiction under section 78A-3-102(3)(a) of the Utah Code. 
Introduction 
In 2006, after 25 years of marriage, Bradley and Jillian Scott divorced. As 
part of the divorce, the trial court awarded Jillian one-half of the marital estate 
and ordered Bradley to pay alimony for the next 25 years. Five years later, the 
trial court terminated the final 20 years of Bradley’s alimony payments and 
ordered Jillian to disgorge over $200,000 in alimony already paid. 
As its ground for terminating the alimony obligation, the trial court ruled 
that Jillian—for a few weeks in 2010 and 2011—cohabitated with her wealthy 
boyfriend, James Okland, while traveling with him on several vacations and 
staying in his vacation house in California. During that time, Jillian and Okland 
each maintained their separate residences in Salt Lake City. Their relationship 
ended six months before Bradley filed his petition to terminate alimony.  
On appeal, the court of appeals panel held that Jillian cohabitated with 
Okland as of the moment they entered the California vacation house. The panel 
erred when it failed to apply the plain language of section 30-3-5(10) of the Utah 
Code, which requires that cohabitation be ongoing to be subject to termination. 
The panel also misinterpreted this court’s test for cohabitation when it 
interpreted the term “domicile” to refer to a relationship with a person—not with 
a place—and when it interpreted “temporary or brief period of time” to refer to a 
state of mind rather than how long cohabitation lasted.   
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Statement of the Issues 
Issue 1: Whether the court of appeals erred in determining that section 
30-3-5(10) of the Utah Code permits a finding of cohabitation warranting a 
termination of alimony when that cohabitation has ceased prior to the filing or 
adjudication of a petition for termination of alimony. 
Standard of Review: This court reviews a decision of the court of appeals 
for correctness. Nichols v. Jacobsen Const. Co., Inc., 2016 UT 19, ¶ 13, 374 P.3d 3. 
This court reviews questions of statutory interpretation for correctness. Id. 
Presentation/Preservation: This issue was addressed by the panel at Scott 
v. Scott, 2016 UT App 31, ¶ 27, 368 P.3d 133. It was presented in the petition for 
writ of certiorari. (Pet. at 8-11.) If necessary, this court may review the issue as an 
application of plain, governing statutory language. Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 
68, ¶ 20, 266 P.3d 828. 
Issue 2: Whether the court of appeals erred in its construction and 
application of the term “domicile” within the standard set forth in Haddow v. 
Haddow, 707 P.2d 669 (Utah 1985), and Myers v. Myers (Myers II), 2011 UT 65, 266 
P.3d 806, for ascertaining the establishment of a common residence.  
Issue 3: Whether the court of appeals erred in its construction and 
application of a temporary or brief time within the standard set forth in Haddow 
and Myers.  
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Standard of Review: The court reviews a decision of the court of appeals 
for correctness. Nichols, 2016 UT 19, ¶ 13. While the question of whether 
cohabitation exists is a mixed question of law and fact, where the analysis is 
“marred by its misconception of the governing legal standard,” the appellate 
courts owe it no deference. Myers II, 2011 UT 65, ¶ 38. In other words, “[t]he 
impact of [the threshold conditions of the cohabitation test] are questions of law 
on which no deference is due, since they do not ‘call for proof,’ but rather for 
‘argument.’” Id. ¶ 36.  
Presentation/Preservation of Issue 2: The panel addressed Issue 2 at Scott, 
2016 UT App 31, ¶¶ 16-20. Issue 2 was presented in the petition for writ of 
certiorari. (Pet. at 11-16.) And the issue was preserved in the trial court at R.2272.  
Presentation/Preservation of Issue 3: The panel addressed Issue 3 at Scott, 
2016 UT App 31, ¶¶ 21-26. The issue was presented in the petition for writ of 
certiorari. (Pet. at 16-19.) And the issue was preserved in the trial court at R.2272. 
Determinative Provision 
“Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former 
spouse is cohabitating with another person.” Utah Code § 30-3-5(10). 
  
 4
Statement of the Case 
1. Nature of the Case  
Under section 30-3-5(10) of the Utah Code, an order to pay alimony 
“terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former 
spouse is cohabitating with another person.” Because alimony is so important for 
thousands of Utahns, the test for cohabitation needs to be predictable and ensure 
that a new relationship has replaced the need for alimony before it terminates.  
Until the panel opinion in this case, the case law set forth a predictable test 
for when a former spouse is cohabitating. Since 1985, cohabitation has required 
(i) a common residence and (ii) an ongoing sexual relationship. Haddow v. 
Haddow, 707 P.2d 669, 672 (Utah 1985). And the “common residency” element 
required “[i] the sharing of a common abode [ii] that both parties consider their 
principal domicile [iii] for more than a temporary or brief period of time.” Id. In 
2011, this court clarified that, even if the two Haddow requirements are satisfied, 
the payor/petitioner must show “other marker[s] of marriage-like cohabitation.” 
Myers II, 2011 UT 65, ¶¶ 2, 16, 21, 39, 266 P.3d 806. 
The panel opinion injects uncertainty into the test for cohabitation. The 
panel ignored the statute’s use of a present tense verb that requires ongoing 
cohabitation to terminate alimony. The panel then changed the meaning of 
“domicile” from what that term means in all other legal contexts. And the panel 
considered a “more than a temporary or brief period of time” to refer to a 
couple’s state of mind, rather than the passage of time.  
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2. Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts begins with a description of the divorce decree 
and alimony obligation. It then sets forth the facts relevant to the correct 
cohabitation analysis. It then sets forth some additional facts the trial court found 
relevant, but which are not. It then describes the reasoning of both lower courts.  
2.1 Background 
Bradley and Jillian Scott were married for approximately 25 years. During 
the marriage, Bradley was successful financially. Jillian raised their four children, 
all of whom are now adults. (R.762-811.) Bradley and Jillian enjoyed a lavish 
lifestyle, including multiple homes and expensive cars. (Id.) They separated after 
Jillian and the children discovered Bradley in the family home with a much 
younger woman, and Bradley responded by assaulting Jillian. (R.780.)  
In 2006, Judge Lubeck, following trial on the property and alimony issues, 
issued a 50-page decision detailing the parties’ history and evaluating their 
relative credibility. (R.762-811.) He divided assets, computed incomes and needs, 
determined Bradley’s financial responsibilities to Jillian and the children, and 
found that Bradley would pay Jillian $8,000 per month in alimony. (R.804-07.)  
Shortly afterwards, the parties settled. (R.817.) The settlement provided 
that Bradley would pay child support and various other expenses for the 
children (R.819-21.) Jillian would receive $6,000 per month in alimony for 25 
years, but alimony would terminate “upon the remarriage or cohabitation of 
Ms. Scott or upon the death of either party.” (R.821.) The court divided the 
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marital property, with Jillian receiving a lump-sum payment and proceeds from 
the sale of certain assets. (R.822-29.) Bradley maintained a $1 million life 
insurance policy naming Jillian as the beneficiary to insure against the loss of 
alimony. (R.849-50.) The court entered a final decree of divorce on August 7, 
2006. (R.838-64.)  
Given the emotional charge and the wealth at issue, the divorce remained 
acrimonious. Between September 2006 and May 2011, the parties were 
repeatedly in court where Jillian repeatedly asked Bradley to satisfy his 
obligations under the divorce decree. (R.868-71 (motion to compel initial alimony 
and child support), 1267-69, 1161-1266 (motion for order to show cause re college 
tuition), 1494-97 (motion for protective order regarding furniture).)  
2.2 Facts relevant to the cohabitation analysis 
In October 2008, Jillian began dating James Okland. (R.2253,3050:6.) 
Okland had a successful career in the family business, Okland Construction. 
Jillian and Okland dated for 30 months before Okland abruptly ended the 
relationship. (R.2247:59.)  
Jillian testified that during their relationship she anticipated that she 
would marry Okland, he purchased a five-carat diamond, he told her to pick out 
a setting for the ring, and he had suggested they marry. (R.2243,2248,3050:221-
23.) Okland testified that he purchased a diamond, but denied giving it to Jillian, 
asking her to pick out a setting, or proposing. (R.2254,3050:90-91.) Jillian emailed 
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her friend and realtor, Brenda Weissman, on December 3, 2010, threatening to 
break up with Okland if he did not propose. (R.Resp.Ex.#63 at BW002192.) 
Okland ended the relationship between mid-March and April 1, 2011. 
(R.2247:59.)  
Jillian’s and Okland’s Separate Homes 
During the relevant time periods, Jillian owned a condominium on South 
Temple in Salt Lake City (R.2238:6,3050:229), and Okland owned a house on 3800 
South in Salt Lake City (R.3050:77,123). Okland and Jillian each testified that they 
lived in their own home and rarely slept at each other’s homes. (R.2255.)  
Okland testified that he did not “move in” to Jillian’s home, did not 
receive mail at Jillian’s home, did not list Jillian’s home as his primary residence 
on documents, and, with the exception of an heirloom item that he did not want 
stolen, did not keep belongings at her home. (R.3050:124-25,238.) Okland did not 
pay Jillian’s mortgage, utilities, or living expenses. (R.3050:232,235-38,130.) They 
did not have joint savings accounts or credit cards. (R.3050:240.) Okland knew 
the code to the underground parking garage at Jillian’s condominium complex 
but did not have a key to her home and could not access her home without a key. 
(R.3050:125-26.) He did not come and go freely from her home. (R.3050:232.) 
Jillian testified that she did not “live in” Okland’s home on 3800 South and 
did not receive mail at Okland’s home. (R.3050:231.) Jillian kept “minimal” 
belongings at his home. (R.3050:82.) Jillian knew the code to Okland’s garage but 
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did not have keys to the house and did not go there unless Okland was there. 
(R.3050:231.) The trial court did not find otherwise. (R.2255.)  
For many years, Jillian employed a housekeeper named Rafael Dillon. 
(R.2257,3050:268.) For a time, Dillon also cared for Okland’s home. (R.3050:266-
67.) Dillon testified that Jillian and Okland did not keep property or cars at each 
other’s homes. (R.3050:271.) According to Dillon, Jillian “did not move out of her 
house.” (R.3014.) Jillian put her home on the market multiple times since the 
divorce but had been unable to sell it by the time of trial. (R.3050:216,229.) 
The Vacations 
During their relationship, Jillian and Okland vacationed often. (R.3050:83-
85.) They traveled to Hawaii (R.3050:89), Puerto Vallarta (R.3050:85), Napa, 
California (R.3050:84,230), and Okland’s home in Sun Valley, Idaho (R.3050:86). 
After Okland retired from Okland Construction in January 2011, Okland and 
Jillian went to Asia on a cruise. (R.3050:86,212.) When not vacationing, Jillian and 
Okland stayed in their respective homes in Salt Lake City. (R.2256,3050:212.)  
Jillian kept ski equipment and apparel in Okland’s Sun Valley vacation 
house, but she never went to it without him. (R.2248,2261,3050:230-31,128.) When 
she shopped for groceries in Sun Valley, she charged them to Okland’s account 
at the local grocery store. (R.3050:231.) Okland and Jillian spent Christmas and 
New Year’s 2010-11 in Sun Valley. (R.3050:101,211.) Jillian selected and Okland 
paid for Christmas decorations for Okland’s Sun Valley house. (R.3050:175.)  
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The California Vacation House 
Toward the end of their relationship, Okland bought another vacation 
house in Rancho Santa Fe, California. (R.3050:78.) The trial court found that 
“Mr. Okland testified Rancho Santa Fe was not intended to be his primary 
residence.” (R.2255,3050:136.) The court did not make a finding contrary to 
Okland’s testimony.  
Jillian was involved in choosing the house and working with the realtor. 
(R.Resp.Ex.#14.) Okland closed on the house in January 2011. (R.3050:31.) He 
paid for it and titled it in the name of his trust. (R.3050:78,135-36,2251.) He billed 
the utilities to his address at Okland Construction in Salt Lake City. (R.2244.) He 
bought the house fully furnished, including beds, tables, chairs, couches, 
television, mirrors, bath mats, garden hoses, speakers, pictures, coffee table 
books, lamps, door mats, even down to the mattress pads of the previous 
owners. (R.Resp.Exs.##14, 34, 37, 38.)  
Jillian contributed items of décor, such as a chest, an iron stand, three stone 
cheetahs, a screen, a spare bed that had been in storage since her divorce from 
Bradley, and a few miscellaneous items. (R.2246,3050:217-18; Resp.Ex.#3.) She 
testified that, at the same time, she transported some furniture from Utah to 
California for her daughters, who were living there. (R.3050:219-20.) Okland and 
Jillian selected a couch for the California house and Okland paid for it. (R.2247.) 
Okland testified that he “considered [the California vacation house] to be 
used by my children, at times [Jillian’s] children.” (R.3050:104-05.) At trial, long 
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after Okland and Jillian had broken up and he had married someone else, 
Okland testified that he still lived in his same house on 3800 South in Salt Lake 
City, owned the California vacation house, and considered it vacation property. 
(R.3050:77-78.) 
 Okland testified that Jillian “knew it was a vacation home.” (R.3050:100.) 
Jillian said that she hated Utah, loved California, loved the house, and hoped to 
retire there someday, but testified that she and Okland “always knew that Salt 
Lake was going to be the primary residence” if they married. (R.3050:211-12.) 
Jillian’s housekeeper testified that Jillian “did not move out of her house” in Salt 
Lake City. (R.3014.)  
Breast Augmentation Surgery 
Jillian testified that for her birthday in November 2010, Okland suggested 
that Jillian have her breasts augmented and offered to pay for the surgery. 
(R.3050:199-200.) Jillian had the surgery but, as a complication, contracted 
Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus (MRSA), which is a very serious, 
potentially life-threatening staph infection described as a “superbug.” 
(R.3050:23,35.) At the end of February 2011, Jillian’s doctor in Los Angeles saw 
her and, because MRSA is resistant to antibiotics, immediately put her in a care 
facility to have corrective surgery. (R.3050:207,248.) After that surgery, she spent 
several days recovering in Los Angeles. (R.3050:248.) In early to mid-March, she 
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returned to Okland’s California vacation house. (R.3050:249.) Her doctor said she 
could not leave California for at least six weeks after the surgery. (Id.) 
The Breakup 
Approximately two weeks after Jillian returned to the California house 
following surgery but no later than April 1, Okland left California and flew home 
to Salt Lake City. (Id.) He called Jillian and left her a voicemail indicating that 
their relationship was over. (Id.) Jillian was still fighting the MRSA infection, and 
several weeks remained in her recovery period. (Id.) 
Jillian’s doctor would not allow her to leave California until the end of that 
period. (Id.) Okland indicated that she could stay in his house until she 
recovered. (Id.) He said she could use his credit card for gas and groceries. 
(R.2247.) She admits she abused that privilege and spent approximately $4,000 
on personal items. (R.3050:161.) Okland supposed she was “kind of angry” about 
the breakup. (R.3050:165.) In response, he was “sort of angry” and canceled the 
cards. (Id.) Okland testified that, because of Jillian’s illness, Jillian stayed in the 
house “longer than it was initially meant to be.” (R.3050:100.) Jillian left the 
house in mid-May 2011. (R.2249.)  
2.3 Facts not relevant to the cohabitation analysis 
The following facts were included in the trial court’s findings and cited by 
the court of appeals. But they are not relevant to the cohabitation analysis. Jillian 
includes these facts only to preclude a citation in the response brief to State v. 
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Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, 326 P.3d 645, even though Jillian is not challenging findings 
of fact relevant to the issue of cohabitation.  
Country Club Memberships 
When Okland bought his house in California, he joined The Bridges, a 
private golf club. (R.3050:14.) The Bridges has a “Family Status” designation for a 
person that “reside[s] with the member on a full-time permanent basis” and is 
approved by the Club. (R.3050:107;Resp.Ex.#9 at 7.) The Club allowed “Family 
Status” to be used by “two unrelated persons living together and maintaining a 
common household.” (R.Resp.Ex.#9 at 7.) Okland indicated on his application to 
the Bridges that Jillian could use his membership under this rule. 
(R.2247,3050:107.) 
Children and Grandchildren 
Jillian and Okland each had children from previous marriages. Okland 
gave $5,000 to Jillian’s youngest daughter, Scarlett, when she graduated from 
high school. (R.3050:90.)  
Two of Jillian’s children sometimes came on vacations with Jillian and 
Okland, including to Hawaii. (R.3050:89.) Scarlett was living with Jillian in Salt 
Lake City until Scarlett left for college in California in the fall of 2010. (R.2255.)  
The Settlement 
After the breakup, Okland offered to pay Jillian $110,000 and, in exchange, 
settle any and all claims that Jillian might have against him. (R.2249.) He 
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testified, “I just wanted to make sure she wouldn’t come back against me for 
something, just not knowing what that might be. I don’t have any idea what that 
might be.” (R.3050:152-53.)  
Problems Receiving Payments from Bradley in 2010 and 2011 
The trial court entered the decree of divorce in August 2006. (R.838-51.) By 
September 2006, Jillian had to request an order to show cause as to why Bradley 
had not begun paying his alimony and child support. (R.868-74.) In February 
2010, Jillian’s lawyer wrote to Bradley’s lawyer, addressing several problems 
with payments for alimony and obligations due the children. (R.1643-44.) The 
letter asked Bradley, apparently not for the first time, to direct deposit money 
into Jillian’s account rather than sending checks. (Id.) Jillian’s lawyer renewed 
this request in May 2010. (R.1645-46.)  
On November 1, 2010, a frustrated Jillian endorsed an alimony check with 
her name and added “hahahahaha.” (R.2243;Resp.Ex.#13.) Shortly thereafter, 
Jillian asserted that Bradley had not paid his court-ordered portion of their 
daughter’s college tuition for September through December 2010. (R.1627-66.) In 
January 2011, while she was dating Okland, Jillian had to request another order 
to show cause, asking the court to order Bradley to pay his portion of those 
expenses. (R.1636-37.) In May 2011, after Okland had broken up with Jillian, the 
trial court ordered Bradley to pay these obligations and direct deposit Jillian’s 
alimony. (R.1850-85.)  
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Five months later, in October 2011, Bradley filed the petition to terminate 
alimony at issue in this appeal. (R.1864-66.)  
2.4 The trial court and court of appeals decisions 
Judge Faust held a hearing on Bradley’s petition to terminate his alimony 
obligation. (R.2235-36.) The trial court determined that Jillian and Okland had 
cohabitated “beginning at least by December 22, 2010, if not earlier” and ending 
in mid-May 2011. (R.2272.) The trial court terminated all of Jillian’s future 
alimony payments. (R.2237-73.) The trial court further ordered Jillian to disgorge 
all alimony payments her since the time cohabitation began, which the court 
deemed to be December 2010. (R.2383-84.) The amount was over $200,000. 
(R.2383-84.) The court also allowed Bradley to terminate the $1,000,000 life 
insurance policy that Bradley was obligated to carry in Jillian’s name. (R.820.) 
The court of appeals panel affirmed, except that it determined that Jillian 
did not begin cohabitating with Okland “until February 17, 2011, when they 
moved into the Rancho Santa Fe house together.” Scott, 2016 UT App 31, ¶ 10. 
The panel held that Jillian and Okland satisfied the test for cohabitation during 
their time in the California home. Id. 
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Summary of the Argument 
Under Utah law, Jillian Scott did not “cohabitate” when she spent six 
weeks with Okland in a vacation house while both of them maintained separate 
residences in Salt Lake City. The panel erred in holding otherwise. 
The panel refused to apply the plain language of section 30-3-5(10) of the 
Utah Code, which allows a court to terminate alimony only if a former spouse “is 
cohabitating.” The panel changed “is” to mean “was.” That issue is dispositive 
because any cohabitation ended months before Bradley filed the petition.  
The panel also changed the test for cohabitation when it misinterpreted the 
“common residence” element. Since 1985, the common residence element has 
required proof of “a common abode that both parties consider their principal 
domicile for more than a temporary or brief period of time.” Haddow v. Haddow, 
707 P.2d 669, 672 (Utah 1985). The panel misinterpreted “domicile” to mean 
something different than it means in all legal contexts—i.e., a person’s 
relationship to a place. The panel interpreted “domicile” to refer to “the nature of 
the couple’s living arrangements as it reflects the individuals’ commitment to 
each other.” Scott v. Scott, 2016 UT App 31, ¶ 19, 368 P.3d 133. The panel also 
misinterpreted “temporary or brief period of time” to refer to “the couple’s state 
of mind,” instead of the length of time in the common abode. Id. ¶ 22.  
This court should enforce the plain language of the statute, restore the test 
for cohabitation, and vacate the order terminating alimony.  
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Argument 
This appeal presents three issues concerning the termination of alimony 
based upon cohabitation under section 30-3-5(10) and this court’s case law.  
To address these issues, this brief is divided into two sections. The first 
section addresses the threshold issue of the interpretation of the word “is” in 
section 30-3-5(10). The second section describes this court’s development of the 
test for cohabitation and then demonstrates that the panel misinterpreted the 
term “domicile” and misconstrued what is a “temporary or brief period of time.”  
1. The panel erred when it interpreted the word “is” in section 30-3-5(10) to 
mean “was,” where the absurdity doctrine does not apply 
Section 30-3-5(10) of the Utah Code provides: 
Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a 
former spouse terminates upon establishment by the 
party paying alimony that the former spouse is 
cohabitating with another person.  
Id. (emphasis added). Bradley filed his petition to terminate alimony six months 
after the relationship between Jillian and Okland ended. (R.1864-66.) The panel 
nonetheless affirmed because it interpreted “is cohabitating” to mean “was 
cohabitating.”1 As demonstrated below, the statute’s plain language and 
underlying policy require that cohabitation be ongoing to terminate alimony.  
                                              
1 The court of appeals recently rejected this argument when interpreting a 
different statute. In Prows v. Labor Commission, the outcome “turn[ed] on a fine 
distinction: what the meaning of the word ‘is’ is.” 2014 UT App 196, ¶ 11, 333 
P.3d 1261. The court held that “[t]ypically, we understand ‘is’ as a present-tense 
form of the verb ‘to be.’ Accordingly, we assume that the legislature used ‘is’ 
here as a present-tense verb.” Id.  
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1.1 The plain language of section 30-3-5(10) requires that cohabitation 
be ongoing to terminate alimony 
The plain language of section 30-3-5(10) operates to terminate alimony 
only “upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is 
cohabitating with another person.”2 The language is not ambiguous, which is 
why neither Bradley nor the panel suggest it is ambiguous. The plain language 
requires that, to terminate alimony, the party paying alimony must establish that 
the “former spouse is cohabitating with another person.” The cohabitation must 
be ongoing at the time the party paying alimony establishes cohabitation. Here, 
the plain language is dispositive because it is undisputed that any cohabitation 
ended months before Bradley established cohabitation. 
The panel did not enforce that plain language on policy grounds, 
something forbidden under this court’s case law. When interpreting statutory 
language, this court assumes, “absent a contrary indication, that the legislature 
used each term advisedly according to its ordinary and usually accepted 
                                              
2 The decree does not depart from the statute. Instead of quoting the entire 
statute, the decree briefly notes that “[a]limony shall terminate upon the 
remarriage or cohabitation of [Jillian] or upon the death of either party.” (R.841.) 
As the panel correctly noted:  
The parties’ decree of divorce differs from the language 
contained in Utah Code section 30–3–5(10). The decree 
provides that Wife’s alimony award “shall terminate upon the 
... cohabitation of [Wife].” However, the parties have 
presented this case as though the statutory language governs 
the result, and for purposes of this analysis we assume that 
the parties’ decree is substantively identical to the statute on 
the issue of cohabitation. 
Scott, 2016 UT App 31, ¶ 9 n.2.  
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meaning.” Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P’ship, 2011 UT 50, ¶ 14, 267 P.3d 863 
(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). The scenarios in which a 
“contrary indication” trumps plain language are where enforcing the plain 
language (i) would “effectively eviscerate[] an entire provision of the statute,” or 
(ii) “leads to results so overwhelmingly absurd no rational legislator could have 
intended them.” Utley v. Mill Man Steel Inc., 2015 UT 75, ¶¶ 29, 46, 375 P.2d 992. 
The first “contrary indication” is self-explanatory—the enforcement of the 
plain language of one section of the Utah Code prevents any enforcement of 
another section of the Utah Code. Because neither Bradley nor the panel suggests 
that this “contrary indication” is in play, Jillian will not discuss it further.  
The second “contrary indication” is the absurdity doctrine. To understand 
the absurdity doctrine, it is important to distinguish it from the absurd 
consequences canon of construction. The absurd consequences canon allows a 
court to choose between two reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutory 
language by rejecting the interpretation that leads to absurd results. Id. ¶ 46. 
Because neither Bradley nor the panel suggests that the language of section 
30-3-5(10) is ambiguous, Jillian will not discuss this canon of construction further.  
The absurdity doctrine is different from the absurd consequences canon. 
Id. ¶ 47. The absurdity doctrine is a “drastic step” that this court has described as 
“strong medicine, not to be administered lightly.” Id. ¶ 48 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). For that reason, this court applies the absurdity doctrine with 
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more caution than it does the absurd consequences canon. Id. Where the 
language is plain, “the statutory language is almost always irrefutable evidence 
of the legislature’s intent, even if it leads to results we regard as impractical or ill-
advised.” Id. For that reason, to override plain language, “the operation of the 
plain language must be more than improvident, it must be so overwhelmingly 
absurd that no rational legislator could have intended the statute to operate in 
such a manner.” Id. 
Here, the panel refused to enforce the plain language of section 30-3-5(10) 
because, in its view, requiring cohabitation to be ongoing before terminating 
alimony was impractical and ill-advised. Scott, 2016 UT App 31, ¶ 33. The panel 
reasoned that because the statute orders that alimony terminate upon 
establishing that the recipient “is cohabitating,” the legislature intended “to 
convey that cohabitation cuts off alimony entirely,” without regard to when that 
cohabitation might have occurred in relation when it was established by the 
payor spouse. Id. ¶ 32. The panel cites as an absurd result the possibility that a 
former spouse would “simply cease” cohabitation to avoid losing alimony. Id.  
The panel never explains why allowing a former spouse to avoid the 
termination of alimony by ending cohabitation is “so overwhelmingly absurd 
that no rational legislator could have intended the result to operate in such a 
manner.” Instead, the panel cites a policy that is not the only policy a rational 
person could adopt—encouraging remarriage over dating. As the panel put it, 
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“[r]equiring cohabitation to be presently occurring, at best, makes cohabitation a 
more advantaged method of engaging in long-term relationships than 
remarriage and, at worst, encourages abuse by creating an incentive for a 
cohabitating spouse to simply cease cohabitation in order to avoid its 
consequences, even when the relationship itself has not ended.” Id. ¶ 33.  
But dating is an acceptable adult post-marriage romantic relationship that 
a rational legislator may want to encourage without putting alimony in jeopardy 
just because the dating adults lived together for a time. For present purposes, it is 
enough that neither Bradley nor the panel has shown that no rational legislator 
could want to encourage that result.  
And to the extent manipulating a living arrangement to avoid the 
termination of alimony is a concern, courts have addressed it. In Pendleton v. 
Pendleton, the ex-wife and her boyfriend attempted to avoid a finding of 
cohabitation by having the boyfriend move out the day before the ex-husband 
filed his petition. 918 P.2d 159, 161 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). The trial court 
“questioned the ‘genuineness’” of the boyfriend’s apartment, noting that he used 
it “as more of an office” and his “nephew actually lived in the apartment.” Id. 
The court of appeals found evidence to support a suspicion that the people were 
cohabitating despite the rental. Id. at 161. Regardless, neither Bradley nor the 
panel has shown that no rational legislator could find that the possible 
manipulation of the test is an acceptable trade-off for requiring ongoing 
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cohabitation before terminating alimony. Requiring ongoing cohabitation 
ensures that the former spouse is in a relationship that can replace the need for 
alimony. There is nothing overwhelmingly irrational about that policy.  
While these considerations are sufficient to demonstrate that the absurdity 
doctrine does not apply and therefore the plain language governs, it is worth 
noting that not only could a rational legislator intend to enforce the plain 
language of section 30-3-5(10), it is the more reasonable position.   
1.2 The plain language interpretation of section 30-3-5(10) is the most 
reasonable interpretation 
A rational legislator could intend the plain language interpretation and its 
consequences. If a relationship akin to marriage does not exist at the time 
alimony is to be terminated, then the former spouse continues to need—and 
under Utah law deserves—the alimony for the reasons expressed in the decree 
awarding alimony in the first place.  
The plain language interpretation is consistent with the statute’s treatment 
of remarriage for purposes of alimony. Alimony terminates when the recipient 
remarries because the new spouse now bears the responsibility for economic 
stability. Utah Code § 30-3-5(9). If the second marriage ends in divorce, the 
second ex-spouse must pay alimony. But if the second marriage is annulled, the 
marriage never existed and so the alimony payment obligations of the first ex-
spouse resumes. Id. (“if the remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab initio, 
payment of alimony shall resume if the party paying alimony is made a party to 
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the action of annulment and the payor party’s rights are determined”). The 
reason for the difference between divorce and annulment is apparent—if a 
former spouse remarries, but the marriage is annulled, alimony is restored 
because the need for alimony is restored.  
With cohabitation, there is no mechanism to restore alimony if the 
cohabitation relationship fails, which perhaps best explains why the legislature 
made it so difficult to terminate alimony based upon cohabitation. As one 
commentator put it, “because there is no legal tie between parties engaged in a 
meretricious relationship, such an arrangement can be readily broken off without 
obligation, and the likelihood that a former wife would be required to resort to 
public assistance is thereby increased.” Diane M. Allen, Annotation, Divorced or 
separated spouse’s living with member of opposite sex as affecting other spouse’s 
obligation of alimony or support under separation agreement, 47 A.L.R. 4th 38, § 2[b] 
(1986). It is not “overwhelmingly irrational” to prevent the termination of 
alimony where cohabitation has ended because, like with annulment, the need 
for alimony remains.   
The plain language is also consistent with the purpose of alimony. As this 
court has explained, “the most important function of alimony is to provide 
support for the wife as nearly as possible at the standard of living she enjoyed 
during marriage, and to prevent the wife from becoming a public charge.” Jones 
v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). In 
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short, “the principal purpose of alimony is economic.” Myers v. Myers (Myers I), 
2010 UT App 74, ¶ 12, 231 P.3d 815. The economic reality for the spouse 
receiving alimony has not changed if the relationship has ended. Again, it is not 
“overwhelmingly irrational” to prevent the termination of alimony where 
cohabitation has ended and therefore the need for alimony remains. 
Finally, a rational legislator could have intended the plain language 
interpretation to avoid abuses by a vindictive payor spouse. The panel’s 
interpretation incentivizes a vindictive payor to wait until long after the 
cohabitation before filing a petition to terminate alimony. The longer he waits, 
the more devastating the consequences, especially if disgorgement is in play. 
Black v. Black, 2008 UT App 465, ¶ 13, 199 P.3d 371. In some cases, as here, that 
could be hundreds of thousands of dollars that the recipient no longer has.  
The plain language does not implicate the absurdity doctrine. A rational 
legislator could have intended to require that cohabitation be ongoing to 
terminate alimony. Because it is undisputed that any cohabitation here was not 
ongoing at the time Bradley filed his petition—let alone, when Bradley 
established cohabitation—this issue is dispositive. This court should vacate the 
order terminating alimony and requiring Jillian to disgorge $200,000 in alimony.  
2. Under this court’s test for “cohabitation,” Jillian and Okland did not 
cohabitate for a few weeks in a California vacation house 
The panel also erred when it changed the test for cohabitation by altering 
the meaning of “domicile” and “temporary or brief period of time” in this court’s 
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test for cohabitation. Before addressing each error, Jillian describes the court’s 
development of the test for cohabitation.  
In 1985, this court announced that “there are two key elements to be 
considered in determining whether [the alimony recipient] was cohabitating 
with [another]: common residency and sexual contact evidencing a conjugal 
association.” Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669, 672 (Utah 1985). Haddow defined 
both of those elements: “common residency means the sharing of a common 
abode that both parties consider their principal domicile for more than a 
temporary or brief period of time. Sexual contact means participation in a 
relatively permanent sexual relationship akin to that generally existing between 
husband and wife.” Id.  
In 1995, the legislature amended the statute to its present form: “Any order 
of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon 
establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating 
with another person.” Utah Code § 30-3-5(10); see id. § 30-3-5(8) (Supp. 1996). 
Between 1995 and 2011, the court of appeals addressed cohabitation by following 
the Haddow two-part test for “common residency” and “sexual contact.” Myers I, 
2010 UT App 74, ¶ 14 (noting that the “court has consistently applied this two-
part test”). 
In 2011, this court confirmed that cohabitation requires two threshold 
conditions of common residency and sexual contact. Myers II, 2011 UT 65, ¶¶ 16, 
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17, 266 P.3d 806. Myers II reaffirmed the Haddow test for common residence: “two 
individuals can be deemed to be cohabitating only if they establish a ‘common 
abode that both parties consider their principal domicile for more than a 
temporary or brief period of time.’” Id. ¶ 16 (emphasis added) (quoting Haddow, 
707 P.2d at 672).  
But Myers II also explained that “cohabitation requires more than a sexual 
relationship between two individuals living under the same roof.” Id. ¶ 2. Myers 
II involved a possible sexual relationship between an adult woman living in her 
parents’ house and a foster teenager living in the same house. This court 
concluded that “[e]ven if [they] had a sexual relationship and lived together 
under the same roof, their relationship had almost none of the other hallmarks of 
a marriage.” Id. ¶ 39. Myers II clarified that in assessing cohabitation, a court 
should first look for the two threshold conditions: (i) whether the parties share a 
common residence and (ii) whether the parties have an ongoing sexual 
relationship. Only if those two conditions are satisfied must the court find that 
the relationship has other hallmarks of a marriage. Id. 
The panel decision blurs the distinct analyses for (i) common residency, (ii) 
sexual relationship, and (iii) the hallmarks of marriage. The panel folded the 
“hallmarks of a marriage” question into the “common residence” question and 
then distorts the Haddow and Myers II definition of “common residency.” In an 
effort to focus on the sexual relationship and discourage cohabitation, the panel, 
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in effect, eliminated the ability of divorcees to know when their dating 
relationships have morphed into alimony-terminating relationships. 
The issue here concerns the test for common residence, the first threshold 
test from Haddow. The common residence test consists of three elements: “[i] the 
sharing of a common abode [ii] that both parties consider their principal domicile 
[iii] for more than a temporary or brief period of time.” Haddow, 707 P.2d at 673; 
Myers II, 2011 UT 65, ¶ 16. Each element concerns a relationship to a place, not to 
another person. The relationship with another person is addressed in the other 
parts of the test—sexual relationship and hallmarks of marriage—not in the test 
for common residency. While the panel was correct that the California vacation 
house was a “common abode,” it erred both in holding that it was the “domicile” 
for Jillian and for Okland and in holding that they stayed in the California 
vacation house for more than a “temporary or brief period of time.”  
2.1 The panel changed the meaning of the term “domicile” within the 
standard set forth in Haddow and Myers for establishing a 
common residence 
The second element of the common residency analysis asks whether the 
parties share a common abode “that both parties consider their principal 
domicile.” Haddow, 707 P.2d at 672. The meaning of “domicile” is about as well-
settled as the meaning of a legal term can be. It describes a person’s relationship 
to a place, not a person’s relationship to another person.  
Following are a few examples: 
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 “Domicile is, of course, a concept widely used in both federal 
and state courts for jurisdiction and conflict-of-laws purposes, 
and its meaning is generally uncontroverted.” Mississippi Band 
of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 48 (1989).  
 “Domicile is the most steadfast of words, and is pretty well 
anchored in legal literature so far as meaning is concerned.” 
Government Emp. Ins. Co. v. Dennis, 645 P.2d 672, 674 n.1 (Utah 
1982) (quoting Weible v. United States, 244 F.2d 158, 163 (9th 
Cir. 1957)). 
 “‘Domicil’ refers to the place where an individual has a true, 
fixed, and permanent home, to which the person is to return 
whenever the person is absent. Domicil is a relationship that 
the law creates between an individual and a particular locality 
or country.” 25 Am. Jur. 2d Domicil § 1 (2016).  
 Domicile is “that place in which a man has voluntarily fixed 
the habitation of himself and family, not for a mere special or 
temporary purpose, but with the present intention of making 
a permanent home, until some unexpected event shall occur to 
induce him to adopt some other permanent home.” What is 
DOMICILE?, TheLawDictionary.org, http://thelawdictionary 
.org/domicile/(last visited Aug. 22, 2016). 
Important here, “every person has a domicil at all times,” but “no person 
has more than one domicil at any one time.” 25 Am. Jur. 2d Domicil § 2 (2016). 
Said differently, “[d]omicile is not necessarily synonymous with residence, and 
one can reside in one place but be domiciled in another.” Choctaw, 490 U.S. at 48 
(citation omitted). As the court of appeals has recognized, “[a] person may . . . 
have multiple physical residences at any one time but only one domicile or legal 
residence.” Lilly v. Lilly, 2011 UT App 53, ¶ 13, 250 P.3d 994. Therefore, the fact 
that Jillian and Okland may have shared the California vacation house as their 
common abode does not make that house their domicile.  
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Generally, a domicile has two features: “physical presence in a place in 
connection with a certain state of mind concerning one’s intent to remain there.” 
Choctaw, 490 U.S. at 48. The “state of mind” consideration asks whether the 
person has intended to abandon one location in favor of another. “One does not 
lose one’s domicil by mere physical presence elsewhere unless that presence is 
accompanied by an intention to abandon the old residence and adopt the new.” 
25 Am. Jur. 2d Domicil § 24 (2016). “The intent to change one’s domicil must 
include an intention to abandon the former domicil permanently or indefinitely. 
If a person establishes a new dwelling place but retains an intention to return to 
the old dwelling place as the person’s only home, the domicil remains at the old 
dwelling place.” Id. § 19 (observation). “The essential fact that raises a change of 
abode to a change of domicile is the absence of any intention to live elsewhere.” 
Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619, 624 (1914).  
The term “domicile” appears repeatedly in the Utah Code and, following 
the settled legal definition, always refers to a person’s relationship to a place: 
 To determine whether insurance companies are subject to Utah 
regulations, Utah Code § 31A-1-301;  
 To assess taxes, id. § 59-10-136; 
 To establish residency for purposes of in-state tuition, id. 
§ 53B-8-102; Frame v. Residency Appeals Comm. of Utah State Univ., 675 
P.2d 1157 (Utah 1983); 
 To decide venue for testacy proceedings, Utah Code § 75-3-201; 
 To determine which jurisdiction has authority to modify a child 
support order, id. §§ 78B-14-205, -613; Lilly v. Lilly, 2011 UT App 53, 
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250 P.3d 994; McLane v. McLane, 570 P.2d 692 (Utah 1977); Plumb v. 
Plumb, 555 P.2d 1205 (Utah 1976).  
“Domicile” is also used in the divorce context in accordance with its settled 
legal definition: 
 To determine whether a divorce obtained by Utah domiciliaries in 
another country was valid, Utah Code § 30-1-2; Atty Gen Op. 91-11 
(Dec. 16, 1993); 
 To determine whether a marriage obtained in another state by Utah 
domiciliaries is binding under Utah law, Utah Code § 30-1-4; In re 
Vetas’ Estate, 170 P.2d 183 (Utah 1946); 
 To determine validity of marriage in court where either party is 
domiciled, Utah Code § 30-1-17; 
 To determine whether parties may divorce in Utah, Utah Code 
§ 30-3-1 (asking whether party is “an actual and bona fide resident 
of this state”); Bustamante v. Bustamante, 645 P.2d 40 (Utah 1982) 
(discussing Utah Code § 30-3-1 in terms of “domiciliary”); Munsee v. 
Munsee, 363 P.2d 71 (Utah 1961); Gardner v. Gardner, 222 P.2d 1055 
(Utah 1950); Weiss v. Weiss, 179 P.2d 1005 (Utah 1947); Schafer v. 
Ritchie, 162 P. 618 (Utah 1916). 
 In each of those contexts, domicile is assessed with factors concerning 
location—such as where the person has a driver’s license, files income taxes, 
earns income, registers vehicles, belongs to organizations, receives mail, obtains 
permits, votes, or has children registered in school. See e.g., Utah Code 
§ 53B-8-102(2), (3)(b); id. § 59-10-136; Utah Admin. Code R. 884-24P-52. This court 
considered the same factors in an adoption case, noting that the factors 
overlapped with the divorce and insurance context. In re Adoption of Baby B, 2012 
UT 35, ¶ 88, 308 P.3d 382. Against the settled legal definition of “domicile,” the 
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panel needed a strong indication that this court used the word differently in the 
test for cohabitation. There is no such indication.   
2.1.1 Under the settled legal definition of the term “domicile,” 
the California vacation house was not the domicile of 
either Jillian or Okland  
As the panel recognized, if the test for common residency uses the settled 
legal definition of “domicile,” then Bradley could not establish cohabitation. 
Neither Okland nor Jillian considered the California vacation house their 
domicile, which is why the trial court did not find to the contrary. Indeed, the 
only trial court finding relevant to domicile was that “Mr. Okland testified 
Ranch[o] Santa Fe was not intended to be his primary residence.” (R.2255.)  
That finding reflects the fact that Okland repeatedly and consistently 
testified that the California house was a vacation house. He testified that the 
house in Salt Lake City has been his permanent residence since 2007. (R.3050:141-
42.) Okland had its utilities billed to his address at Okland Construction in Salt 
Lake City. (R.2244.) Okland received mail at his Salt Lake home and office, 
remained a Utah resident, maintained a Utah driver’s license, and did not apply 
for anything indicating he was residing in another state. (R.Resp.Ex.#4 at 9-10.)  
Okland also testified that he did not intend that the California house 
would become his primary residence (R.3050:136), because it was a “vacation 
home” (R.3050:141). He did not move his belongings to the California vacation 
house, but instead purchased the house fully furnished, including tables, chairs, 
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beds, TVs, decorations, waste baskets, down to even personal, intimate items like 
mattress pads. (R.Resp.Exs.##14, 34, 37, 38.)  
Jillian testified that she did not intend the California vacation house to be 
her domicile. (R.3050:247.) Jillian’s housekeeper testified she “did not move out 
of her house” in Salt Lake City. (R.3014.) Okland confirmed that Jillian “knew it 
was a vacation home.” (R.3050:100.) Consistent with this, Jillian did not change 
her mailing address, bank accounts, or cell phone records, and did not file taxes 
in California. (R.3050:250.) 
Under the settled legal definition of “domicile,” the California vacation 
house was not the domicile of either Jillian or Okland. To hold otherwise, the 
panel instead changed the test for domicile. In doing so, the panel erred.  
2.1.2 The panel changed the meaning of domicile in the 
cohabitation context 
The panel held that “domicile” means something different in the 
cohabitation context than in every other legal context. According to the panel, in 
the cohabitation context the term “domicile” refers to a person’s relationship to 
another person. Scott, 2016 UT App 31, ¶ 19. As the panel explained, “the concept 
of residence or domicile in the cohabitation context seems focused on the nature 
of the couple’s living arrangements as it reflects the individuals’ commitment to each 
other.” Id. (emphasis added). Put differently elsewhere, “[t]he term ‘cohabitating’ 
is not statutorily defined, but judicial usage of the term as well as corresponding 
references to ‘domicile’ in our case law suggest that the legislature did not intend 
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the residency component of cohabitation to be so rigid as to be satisfied only if 
each member of the couple intends their common residence to be his or her sole 
and permanent residence.” Id. ¶ 17. 
But the test articulated by this court in Haddow and Myers II does not 
support the panel’s analysis. In articulating the test for common residency, this 
court used three distinct terms in one sentence: “common residency means the 
sharing of a common abode that both parties consider their principal domicile for 
more than a temporary or brief period of time.” Haddow, 707 P.2d at 672 
(emphases added); Myers II, 2011 UT 65, ¶ 16. The terms “residency,” “abode,” 
and “domicile” have distinct and settled legal meanings. This court would not 
have used those terms to mean something else without so indicating. Nor does 
the panel explain why the legislature would have intended any meaning other 
than the meaning in this court’s test.   
A review of this court’s cases reveals that the terms, including the term 
“domicile,” have their settled legal meaning. In Knuteson v. Knuteson, the ex-
husband stopped paying alimony. 619 P.2d 1387, 1388 (Utah 1980). In financial 
straits, the ex-wife moved into her neighbor’s house and then began a sexual 
relationship with him. Id. She took with her the beds, a refrigerator and dresser, 
and a stove. Id. She stayed there for two months and ten days until she garnished 
her ex-husband’s wages and moved back to “her own home.” Id. This court 
concluded that she “was not a ‘resident’ in [the neighbor’s] home in the statutory 
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sense [as evidenced by the fact] that she expended much of her efforts in the 
daytime at her own home doing chores and yard work.” Id.3 Thus, this court 
concluded she was not cohabitating with the neighbor. Id. It is notable that the 
court did not consider the seriousness of the relationship with the neighbor in 
determining whether she was a “resident.”  
In Haddow, there was no dispute that the house in question was the ex-
wife’s only domicile, and “[t]here was no dispute that [the boyfriend] spent most 
of his free time with [the ex-wife].” 707 P.2d at 670. He ate dinner at her house 
almost nightly, he often stayed late, he slept over once a week, he left some 
clothes at her house, and he occasionally showered and changed clothes at her 
house. Id. He “maintained a separate residence, however, living at his parents’ 
home.” Id. at 671. The court concluded that “the common residency element of 
cohabitation has not been established” because neither the ex-wife nor the 
boyfriend considered her home to be the boyfriend’s “principal residence.”4 Id. at 
674. Again, there was no analysis of the seriousness of their relationship in 
determining “residence.” In dissent, Chief Justice Hall thought that the majority’s 
                                              
3 Additionally, as will be discussed below, Ms. Knuteson’s nine-week stay 
was “temporary,” i.e., not long enough for cohabitation. 619 P.2d at 1389.  
4 The panel considered it important that Haddow used the phrase “principal 
domicile” rather than “domicile.” Scott, 2016 UT App 31, ¶ 17. The panel 
reasoned that this must indicate that parties have more than one domicile. But 
this court’s use of the term “principal,” rather than changing the test for 
domicile, only served to explain that the “domicile” in question must be the 
principal place that a person lives—that is, cohabitation requires that the person’s 
domicile cannot be elsewhere from the common abode.  
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definition of “cohabitation” was too “sterile,” and contended that the boyfriend 
and ex-wife were cohabitating “at least on a part-time basis.” Id. (Hall, C.J., 
dissenting). None of the other justices agreed with Justice Hall.  
Finally, in Myers II, this court held that the ex-wife and her boyfriend were 
not cohabitating. 2011 UT 65, ¶ 2. The relationship was between an adult 
daughter (the ex-wife) who slept occasionally at her parents’ home, and a foster 
teenager living in the same house. Id. ¶ 6. The foster teen undoubtedly lived at 
the house, and the ex-wife “received mail at that address and listed it as her 
home address on documents.” Id. She slept there as much as 80% of the time. Id. 
¶ 10. The court accepted for the sake of argument that the two shared a common 
residence and had a sexual relationship. The court nonetheless held that 
“whatever this relationship was, ‘it bore little resemblance to a marriage.’” Id. 
¶ 39 (quoting Myers I, 2010 UT App 74, ¶ 18). Myers II confirms that the nature of 
the couple’s relationship to each other is accounted for in the “hallmarks of 
marriage,” not the “common residency,” test.5 Id.  
                                              
5 The panel also relied on prior court of appeals’ decisions, including Levin v. 
Carlton-Levin, 2014 UT App 3, 318 P.3d 1177 and Sigg v. Sigg, 905 P.2d 908 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1995). These do not support a new definition of “domicile” in the 
cohabitation context. In Sigg, the ex-wife and her boyfriend lived in different 
condominiums in the same condominium complex. 905 P.2d at 917-18. Both 
parties considered their respective condos to be their domiciles, and neither 
contended they lived anywhere else. Id. They contended only that they did not 
live in the same condo. Id. If anything, this case argues for a different definition of 
“abode.” In Levin v. Carlton-Levin, the boyfriend claimed he lived at his brother’s 
house, rather than the ex-wife’s house, and the trial court found to the contrary. 
2014 UT App 3, ¶ 16. To the extent the court of appeals’ decisions are at odds 
with the settled meaning of “domicile,” this court should overrule them.   
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In summary, the panel changed the meaning of “domicile” in the test for 
common residency. The panel interpreted “domicile” to refer to a relationship 
with a person, not with a place, and thereby inserted uncertainty into the test for 
cohabitation. This court should restore the meaning of the term “domicile” in the 
test for common residency to the settled legal meaning the term “domicile” has 
in every other legal context. Under that definition of “domicile,” Jillian and 
Okland were not cohabitating in the California vacation house because neither 
Jillian nor Okland intended to abandon their Salt Lake City homes as their 
principal residence and to substitute the California vacation house as their 
principal residence. This court should reverse the panel opinion and vacate the 
order terminating alimony.  
2.2 The panel erred when it failed to interpret the phrase “a 
temporary or brief period of time” in accordance with the standard 
set forth in Haddow and Myers 
The third component of the “common residency” test asks whether the 
parties were in a common abode that they both considered their domicile “for 
more than a temporary or brief period of time.” Haddow, 707 P.2d at 672; Myers, 
2011 UT 65, ¶ 16. Assuming for the sake of argument that Jillian and Okland 
considered the California vacation house to be their domicile, they did not do so 
for “more than a temporary or brief period of time.” 
This court has explained that “cohabitation is not a sojourn, nor a habit of 
visiting, nor even remaining with for a time; the term implies continuity.” Myers 
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II, 2011 UT 65, ¶ 16; Haddow, 707 P.2d at 673. To provide an indication of how 
long continuity is required for cohabitation, the Haddow court cited Knuteson for 
the proposition that “a stay of two months and ten days did not establish a 
‘settled abode.’” Haddow, 707 P.2d at 673 (citing Knuteson, 619 P.2d at 1389).  
If nine weeks is insufficient as a matter of law, then the six weeks Jillian 
and Okland spent in the California vacation home is insufficient as a matter of 
law. Jillian and Okland arrived in California in mid-February. By the end of 
February, Jillian was in a care facility having corrective surgery and battling 
MRSA. In March, Jillian was in the California vacation house recovering under 
doctor’s orders not to leave California for six weeks. And no later than April 1, 
Okland had ended the relationship and returned to Salt Lake City. (R.2255.)  
April 1 fixes the end of any cohabitation for two reasons. First, their sexual 
relationship ended at this time and so the “sexual contact” requirement for 
cohabitation ceased. Haddow, 707 P.2d at 672. Second, once Okland returned 
home and ended the relationship, they did not have a common abode. Any 
cohabitation did not exceed six weeks—from mid-February to April 1, 2011. 
Because the meaning of “temporary or brief” should not change from case 
to case, it is dispositive that two months and ten days— a little more than nine 
weeks— was not long enough in Knuteson. The panel rejected this 
straightforward analysis, not by disputing the facts, but by changing the legal 
standard. As the panel explained, “the six weeks together in Rancho Santa Fe 
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was not so brief as to nullify as a matter of law the final step they took into 
cohabitant status once they crossed the threshold of the Rancho Santa Fe house.” 
Scott, 2016 UT App 31, ¶ 25 (emphasis added). The panel opined that 
“‘temporary’ focuses more on the couple’s state of mind—that is, whether 
moving in together is [i] motivated or accompanied by a desire to operate as a 
couple for the foreseeable future or is [ii] simply an expedient arrangement with 
no enduring quality.” Id. ¶ 22.  
On the panel’s interpretation, the test for “temporary or brief period of 
time” becomes redundant with the “hallmarks of a marriage” by focusing on the 
nature of the relationship and with “domicile” by focusing on the enduring 
quality of the housing arrangement.6 But “temporary or brief period of time” 
refers to a period of time, not a state of mind.  
The panel’s interpretation is founded in its misreading of Knuteson, 619 
P.2d at 1388. Ms. Knuteson moved to her neighbor-turned-boyfriend’s house 
because she could not afford her own home when her ex-husband stopped 
paying alimony. Knuteson, 619 P.2d at 1388. When her ex-husband began again 
paying alimony, she returned to her own home. Id. She was at the neighbor’s 
home for a total of two months and ten days. Id. This court wrote that 
“Mrs. Knuteson was not a ‘resident’ in [the neighbor’s] home in the statutory 
                                              
6 An expedient arrangement with no enduring quality is not a domicile. 
Choctaw, 490 U.S. at 48 (“Domicile is established by physical presence in a place 
in connection with a certain state of mind concerning one’s intent to remain 
there.”).  
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sense . . . and . . . the wording of the statute does not appear to cover a temporary 
stay at another’s home.” Id. at 1389. The opinion says nothing about the 
seriousness of Ms. Knuteson’s relationship with the neighbor. 
And yet the panel stated that “the [Knuteson] court seemed to conclude 
that despite the common residency and the sexual relationship, the ex-wife did 
not cohabit with the neighbor because the quality of their relationship was temporary 
and its duration was insufficient to undermine that conclusion.” Scott, 2016 UT 
App 31, ¶ 23 (emphasis added).  
The panel misread Knuteson. Knuteson did not address the nature of the 
relationship. This court determined only that Ms. Knuteson was not cohabitating 
because she was not a “resident” of the neighbor’s house and because she did not 
stay there for more than a temporary or brief period of time. Knuteson, 619 P.2d 
at 1389. In other words, under Knuteson, the common residency component 
focuses on just that, the residency, and not the nature of the relationship.  
A correct reading of Knuteson is consistent with Myers II. As explained 
above, Myers II makes clear that two individuals can be deemed to be 
cohabitating “only if” they have (i) a sexual relationship and (ii) a common 
residency, and if they do, then the court will look to see whether (iii) their 
relationship bears the hallmarks of a marriage. 2011 UT 65, ¶¶ 16, 21, 39.  
Myers II did not determine that the parties were not residing together 
because the arrangement was “temporary.” In fact, Myers II could have said that 
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the living arrangement was “an expedient arrangement with no enduring 
quality.” But instead, this court said that even if there was a common residency, 
the relationship did not rise to the level of cohabitation because it bore none of 
the other hallmarks of marriage. Id. ¶ 39. As a result, in Myers II, this court did in 
fact focus on the nature of the relationship, but made it a third consideration.  
The panel attempted to distinguish Knuteson because Jillian and Okland 
“established an ‘intimate and exclusive’ dating arrangement that culminated in 
the couple moving in together.” Scott, 2016 UT App 31, ¶ 24. The court of appeals 
then listed a series of facts regarding the seriousness of Jillian and Okland’s 
relationship. Id. The court of appeals concluded that “neither [Jillian] nor 
[Okland] intended their common residency in Rancho Santa Fe to be temporary.” 
Id. This is incorrect. The nature of their relationship is a different part of the 
analysis. As a result, the court of appeals erased any meaningful distinction 
between the nature of a couple’s relationship and their living arrangements. The 
result is that the common residency test is, in effect, eliminated.  
2.2.1 The panel decision is based on facts that are immaterial 
and incorrect 
Although immaterial under the correct legal standard, it is worth 
correcting a few factual errors in the panel opinion.  
First, the panel stated that Jillian and Okland brought significant 
household and personal property together in one place: “In anticipation of 
moving from Salt Lake City, [Jillian] hired movers to pack up all of her 
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household belongings and transport them to Rancho Santa Fe. [Okland] also 
made arrangements to have their personal belongings, including his vehicle, and 
his and [Jillian]’s computers, linens, and clothing, either shipped to California or 
transported by private plane. The pair purchased a couch to furnish the Rancho 
Santa Fe house.” Scott, 2013 UT App 31, ¶ 13; see also id.¶¶ 6, 25.  
But Okland brought essentially nothing from Salt Lake City and, instead, 
bought the house furnished. The California vacation home came with tables, 
chairs, lamps, mirrors, TV, mattresses, headboards, armoires, garden hoses, door 
mats, bath mats, bedding, outdoor furniture, pictures, candle holders, bar stools, 
fountains, pots and plants, a coffee table including the books on it, a basket 
including the magazines in it, and even a bathroom waste basket.7 
(R.Resp.Ex.#37, 38.) To show the extent of what was in the house, the realtor 
emailed to tell Jillian about “the mattress pad which appeared to be in like new 
condition on both beds.” (R.Resp.Ex. #14 at 45.)  
And Jillian did not “pack up all of her household belongings.” Id. ¶ 13. 
Jillian’s housekeeper testified she “did not move out of her house” in Salt Lake 
City. (R.3014.) Jillian contributed primarily items of luxury décor, not practical 
“household belongings.” (R.2246,3050:217-18.) In the same moving truck, she 
sent a “big table” and a mirror for one daughter and a chandelier for another, 
                                              
7 The panel noted that Jillian helped Okland pick out a couch in California, 
without acknowledging that Okland bought a couch in California rather than 
shipping his Utah couches to California. (R.2247.) It cannot be that bringing items 
shows cohabitation and also that failing to bring items shows cohabitation.  
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both of whom lived separately in California. (R.3050:219-20.) Everything else 
Jillian owned remained in Salt Lake City.  
Second, the panel stated that Okland “arranged to have his vehicle 
shipped to California,” as though it (a Porsche) were his only vehicle. Scott, 2016 
UT App 31, ¶ 6. In the email that details the move of the car, Okland explained 
that he hoped his Range Rover would be “done” so that he could drive it to the 
Salt Lake City airport and have “someone else . . . pick it up and put it in my 
garage” in Salt Lake City. In other words, he planned to take an extra car to 
California and leave at least one car in Salt Lake City. (R.Resp.Ex.#32.) When he 
broke up with Jillian, he left the Porsche in California. (R.2249.)  
Third, the panel incorrectly asserts that Jillian and Okland were engaged. 
Scott, 2016 UT App 31, ¶¶ 6, 24. The record does not support that assertion. 
While the parties had discussed marriage and Jillian hoped to get married, they 
were not engaged. (R.2254, 3050:90-91,3050:224.) In fact, in an email from Jillian 
to her realtor on December 3, 2010, she wrote “James promised me a home in 
Rancho Santa Fe and an engagement last August. So far nothing!! I’m giving him 
till the end of the cruise. If there is not a diamond on my hand by then, I’m 
walking . . . .” (R.BW002192.) Apparently she changed her mind because she did 
not “walk,” but there is no debate that there was “not a diamond.”  
Fourth, the panel incorrectly asserts that “after the move, one of [Jillian]’s 
daughters, who was by then an adult, moved in with the couple.” Scott, 2016 UT 
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App 31, ¶ 25. This also finds no support in the record. The daughter in question, 
Scarlett, was in college, having “moved to California to go to school in September 
2010,” several months before these incidents ever happened. (R.2255.) One 
acquaintance testified that the daughter was going to college in California and 
might—potentially—come to the house “during vacations and 
summers.”(R.2253,3050:27.) The acquaintance’s husband believed that Jillian’s 
daughter “was going to” stay at the house. (R.2251.) But there was no testimony 
or evidence that she did, until after relationship ended when Scarlett came to 
comfort her mother during her MRSA recovery. (R.2249,3050:21.) At trial, when 
counsel asked Jillian whether Scarlett had a bedroom in the California vacation 
house, she clarified, “[a]ctually we had a girls bedroom because he has 
granddaughters and we had a boys bedroom because he has grandsons and a 
son. . . . So we had girls and boys.” (R.3050:218.)  
While these factual misstatements are immaterial, they are worth 
correcting because they paint a picture different from what occurred. 
3. Jillian also requests that this court remand for the purpose of awarding 
her attorney fees at trial and on appeal 
Jillian requests that the court award her attorney fees incurred in the trial 
court and on appeal if she prevails and thereby becomes the prevailing party in 
this action to enforce an alimony order. Utah Code § 30-3-3(2). Section 30-3-3 
authorizes an award of attorney fees in an action concerning alimony. Id. Jillian 
requests that this court remand with an instruction to award attorney fees. 
Conclusion 
This court should reverse the panel opinion affirming the district court's 
termination of alimony. First, Jillian's relationship with Okland ended months 
before Bradley u established" cohabitation, and, therefore, under the plain langue 
of section 30-3-5(10) of the Utah Code, the district court erred in terminating 
alimony. 
Second, even if Bradley had requested to terminate alimony sooner, the 
action would have failed because Jillian and Okland did not cohabitate in the 
California vacation house. Neither Jillian nor Okland considered the California 
Vacation house to be their u domicile" and, even if they had, they did not stay 
there together for more than a u temporary or brief period of time. On any one of 
these grounds, this court should reverse and award Jillian her attorney fees as 
the prevailing party. 
DATED this 22nd day of August, 2016. 
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